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Self-injury as embodied emotion-work: Managing 
rationality, emotions and bodies 
 
Drawing on narrative research conducted in the UK about self-injury and 
embodiment, this article presents a novel sociological analysis of self-injury, 
utilising the concept of emotion work. By focusing explicitly on embodied 
methods of ‘doing’ emotion work, the paper highlights the under-recognised 
importance of examining the practical, corporeal practices that can be 
involved in emotion work. I reflect on the sociological and theoretical 
significance of examining self-injury as embodied emotion work – both as an 
analytic concept and a narrative resource.  
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Introduction 
 
Self-harm is usually studied from a clinical perspective: however, sociological 
approaches have the potential to greatly improve understandings of the practice. 
Sociological work in this area is increasing, but there are important features of self-
harm that remain under-explored. Different methods of self-harm are often 
overlooked – in this paper I examine self-injury (cutting, burning or hitting the outside 
of the body) rather than self-poisoning. Further, emotional aspects of self-harm have 
been engaged with relatively superficially, despite this being a key clinical area, and 
there being a wealth of theoretical work on emotions that could be drawn upon 
(Lupton, 1998b; Williams, 1998a; Williams, 2001). This paper analyses accounts of 
self-injury as embodied emotion work. In doing this, I highlight hitherto under-
examined aspects of both self-injury and emotion work.  
 
Conceptualising self-injury as embodied emotion work demonstrates a way in which 
self-injury can be understood sociologically. Accounts, and perhaps practices, of self-
injury are shown to be closely tied to socio-cultural contexts. Sociological approaches 
should therefore be central to attempts to understand self-injury, challenging clinical 
psychological and psychiatric perspectives which tend to frame self-injury as a 
‘problem’ located within the individual. Further, this analysis extends existing 
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sociological theorisation on emotion work. In contrast to research which has 
examined cognitive methods and feeling rules, I focus instead on the less frequently 
considered practical, corporeal ‘work’ that self-injury (and emotion work) entails. In 
my analysis, self-injury and emotion work are grounded in the bodies of people who 
self-injure, emphasising the continued importance of incorporating bodies into 
sociological analyses of emotions, emotion work, and social life.  
 
A general definition of self-harm in the UK is ‘self-poisoning or self-injury 
irrespective of the purpose of the act’ (NICE, 2004: 16). However, definitional 
problems have compromised academic and clinical understandings (Chandler et al., 
2011). In particular, research has tended to gloss over the practical aspects of the 
behaviour, treating self-injury and self-poisoning as broadly similar. Although there 
are commonalities, I argue that in important ways the behaviours are distinct (see also 
Claes & Vandereycken, 2007). Self-injury involves the cutting, burning or hitting of 
the outside of the body. Self-poisoning usually involves (in the UK) ingesting higher 
than recommended doses of medication. Any damage caused by self-injury is 
immediately apparent, and can cause lasting (sometimes permanent) marks upon the 
skin. In contrast, injuries caused by self-poisoning may not be obvious, and certainly 
tend not to leave lasting visible marks. The differential visibility of self-injury and 
self-poisoning may have important implications in how the behaviours are 
understood, an issue I discuss elsewhere (Chandler, 2010). Further, self-poisoning is 
far more likely to be treated clinically, making up around 80% of self-harm 
presentations at Accident and Emergency departments (Hawton et al., 2004). 
Conversely, self-injury appears to be more common in (adolescent) community 
samples, but less likely to be treated clinically (Hawton et al., 2002)
1
.  
 
Self-harm in general, and self-injury specifically, are said to be increasing in 
prevalence (Brophy, 2006)
2
. However, measuring population levels of self-harm is 
notoriously difficult: it is often framed as a ‘secretive’ behaviour, and hospital 
presentations measure only a small proportion of all cases – a situation more acute 
with regard to self-injury (Hawton et al., 2002). The majority of studies that have 
sought to measure self-harm in community populations have focused upon adolescent 
groups (Hawton et al., 2002; O'Connor et al., 2009). Hawton et al (2002) found that 
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around 13% of adolescents reported ever self-harming, 6.9% reported self-harm in the 
last 12 months, with around 65% of this latter group reporting self-injury or self-
cutting. Self-injury is increasingly understood to occur across a range of social 
contexts and groups (Adler & Adler, 2007). Despite this, statistics regarding the 
incidence of self-injury or self-harm among general adult populations in the UK do 
not currently exist.  
 
Sociological work on self-harm (and self-injury) is increasing. However, definitions 
are not always clear, and, reflecting existing clinical biases (Chandler et al., 2011) 
research has focused upon certain groups: women (Harris, 2000; Hodgson, 2004; 
Inckle, 2007), young people (Scourfield et al., 2011) and clinical patients (Hadfield et 
al., 2009; Redley, 2003). An significant exception to this is the work of Adler and 
Adler (2005; 2007; 2008) who have examined the sociological characteristics of self-
injury from a deviance and social learning perspective, using a more diverse, 
community-based sample. Despite these important contributions self-injury remains 
an under-theorised and little understood behaviour. Sociological approaches can offer 
a great deal in expanding and challenging existing understandings of self-injury, and 
self-harm (see Cresswell, 2005 for an analysis of service user groups who have 
challenged understandings of self-harm). In particular, work on self-injury and self-
harm has generally overlooked the embodied and practical aspects of the behaviours 
(with the notable exception of Inckle, 2007). Self-injury and self-harm are inherently 
embodied, and my own work demonstrates the importance of an embodied approach 
in understanding explanations for self-injury.  
 
Emotions and emotion work 
 
Emotions are increasingly central to attempts to explain self-injury. A review of the 
clinical literature found that in studies which collected self-reported reasons for self-
injury, the most commonly cited was ‘affect regulation’ (Klonsky, 2007). Affect 
regulation is a clinical term incorporating descriptions such as: ‘stopping negative 
feelings’; ‘relieving anxiety/fear’; ‘tension release’; and ‘stress management’ 
(Klonsky, 2007: 230-1). Clinical survey research which asked about feelings before 
This paper was published in Sociology by SAGE Publications Ltd, All rights reserved. © please 
cite as: Chandler, A. (2012). Self-injury as embodied emotion-work: Managing rationality, 
emotions and bodies. Sociology, 46(3), 442-457. 
 
 4 
and after self-injury has endorsed the hypothesis that self-injury is carried out in order 
to increase positive feelings, or decrease negative feelings (Klonsky 2007). 
 
Clinical research on the emotional aspects of self-injury is limited in a number of 
important ways. Firstly, the importance of the socio-cultural context of emotions is 
rarely, if ever, acknowledged. Emotions tend to be treated as universal and relatively 
unproblematic categories, with data generally collected through the use of highly 
structured clinical questionnaires. Although in some cases familial contexts are 
addressed (Wedig & Nock, 2007), little attention is given to the wider socio-cultural 
contexts of individuals who self-injure and how this might account for or explain the 
emotional problems being reported. More usually, emotional problems are located 
within the individual who self-injures: they ‘struggle to regulate’ their emotions; they 
have difficulty naming emotional states; they are ‘unable’ to continue with normal 
tasks whilst experiencing strong emotions (e.g. Gratz, 2007). Clinical accounts 
therefore obscure socio-cultural contexts that might contribute to or mediate these 
‘problems’.   
 
Qualitative studies also report that self-injury is closely tied to emotions and 
emotional regulation (Horne & Csipke, 2009). Alexander and Clare (2004) found that 
self-injury was described as a method of ‘releasing’ painful emotions. Crouch and 
Wright’s (2004: 192) detailed study of understandings about self-harm in an 
adolescent in-patient psychiatric unit found that patients frequently reported that self-
harm caused a ‘release’ which helped individuals to ‘calm down’. Similarly, Adler 
and Adler (2007) reported that some participants referred to their self-injury as being 
a way of ‘expressing’ emotions. Solomon and Farand (1996: 115) found some 
participants suggested self-injury was a way of ‘transforming’ emotional distress into 
a more manageable physical pain. Some of these accounts also address the social 
contexts in which self-injury can take place, often focusing on problems with families 
and relationships.  
 
Both lay and clinical accounts share a concern with the management or regulation of 
emotional experience. Many of these accounts are limited in important ways. Clinical 
work treats emotions in a reductionist manner, emotions are treated as individual, 
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experiences rather than inter-relational ‘complexes’ (Burkitt, 1997; Williams, 1998a), 
avoiding any engagement with the wider socio-cultural contexts of emotional life. 
Both types of accounts tend to gloss over the ways in which people who self-injure 
explain their use of self-injury in regulating their emotions; descriptions of what self-
injury ‘does’ tend to be taken at face value.  Finally, existing accounts of self-injury 
and emotions rarely address the embodied nature of emotions.  
 
The focus on emotional management and regulation in existing literature points to the 
potential usefulness of Hochschild’s concept of emotion work. Despite numerous 
challenges (Bolton & Boyd, 2003; Wouters, 1989), emotion work continues to be 
both influential and valuable in sociological theorisation (Freund, 1990; Frith & 
Kitzinger, 1998; Taylor, 2010; Theodosius, 2006; 2008). Hochschild’s (1979) original 
formulation suggests there are three techniques through which people carry out 
emotion work: cognitive; bodily and expressive. Hochschild was clear that cognitive, 
bodily and expressive emotion work were not practically separable. However, much 
subsequent work has tended to focus on analyses of feeling rules, rather than the 
techniques used by people to ‘do’ emotion work. Where techniques are examined 
these are generally cognitive or expressive types of emotion work (Bolton & Boyd, 
2003; Theodosius, 2006). Bodily methods are less often addressed (Knights & 
Thanem, 2005) – though in some work, the embodied nature of emotions is 
occasionally noted (e.g. Theodosius, 2008). Indeed, although sociological work on 
emotions increasingly acknowledges embodiment, much existing writing on emotion 
work engages very little with embodied methods that individuals might use to ‘do’ 
emotion work. This mirrors a similar trend in writing on self-harm, where the bodily 
practices of ‘doing’ self-harm, and how these are accounted for and understood, are 
frequently under-examined.  
 
In this paper I take the work of Frith and Kitzinger (1998) as a starting point in 
assessing the narrative functions of talk about self-injury as emotion work. Frith and 
Kitzinger (1998) noted the potential pitfalls of using emotion work only as an analytic 
category (see also Taylor, 2010). Their analysis of the use of emotion work in the 
narratives of women describing unwanted sexual encounters demonstrated the 
importance of examining emotion work as a participant resource, as well as an 
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analytic category. Frith and Kitzinger suggested that women used narratives about 
emotion work to frame themselves as active and responsible, rather than as ‘victims’. 
Their analysis challenged more traditional approaches to examining emotion work, 
which, they argued, take interview accounts as ‘evidence’ that emotion work is 
occurring. Frith and Kitzinger demonstrated that analysing the narrative functions of 
interview talk can highlight links between explanatory accounts and wider socio-
cultural concerns: in this case highlighting women’s resistance to dominant ‘victim’ 
narratives. Similarly, my analysis examines the ways in which emotion work was 
used in the narratives of people who self-injure; rather than focusing solely on the 
presence of such talk.  
 
Theorising embodied accounts 
 
Rose (2003: 54) has suggested that emotional or mental health complaints are 
attributed more and more to malfunctions in the physical brain. Following this, 
individuals are more likely to “define key aspects of one’s individuality in bodily 
terms … and to try to reform, cure or improve oneself by acting on that body” (2003: 
54) a view Rose terms somatic individuality. Arguments analogous to somatic 
individuality have been used to account for the proliferation of physical treatments for 
mental illness, in particular pharmaceuticals (Lyon, 1996), though this argument is not 
without its critics (Abraham, 2010). Alongside this, and more importantly for my 
purposes, is the understanding that these (contested) changes in the framing of 
particularly ‘emotional’ problems have had wider effects on the ways in which people 
understand, account for and interpret their emotional lives (Stepnisky, 2007). 
Applying Rose’s concept of somatic individuality to accounts of self-injury as 
embodied emotion work may offer some indication as to why self-injury is accounted 
for in certain ways: in particular, the use of biomedical terminology to explain the 
efficacy of the practice. I suggest that accounts of self-injury might be interpreted as 
non-pharmaceutical methods of ‘working on’ the self, via the management of 
emotions through the body. 
 
In a different, though equally embodied vein, Williams (1998b) has theorised the 
‘performance’ of health in late modernity. He argues that the competing desires for 
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control and release, along with the inherent uncontrollability of bodies, are reflected 
in ‘performances’ of health. Reflecting contradictory understandings of what it means 
to be healthy, health is about both control and release. These arguments are related to 
understandings about what it means to be emotionally healthy. Lupton (1998a: 47-48) 
explored lay understandings of emotions finding that emotional control was valued, 
but simultaneously the need for emotional release and expression was acknowledged. 
Motifs of control and release are also prominent in accounts of self-injury: thus, these 
narratives could be seen to reflect contradictory socio-cultural understandings of 
(emotional) health, simultaneously expressing the need/desire for both release and 
control.  
 
Williams, Lupton and Rose share a concern with the embodied nature of social life 
and of individual attempts to account for practices and understandings related to 
health and emotions. As such, their work is useful in expanding existing sociological 
understanding of self-injury. In the remainder of this paper I will demonstrate that 
self-injury can be understood as a form of embodied emotion work. I will suggest 
ways in which the concept of emotion work can be expanded, both through a focus on 
embodiment, and by incorporating theoretical perspectives on embodiment, rationality 
and modernity.  
 
Methodology 
 
Sampling and recruitment 
 
The data reported here is drawn from narrative, life story research that explored the 
‘lived experience’ of self-injury (Chandler 2010; McCormack 2004; Riessman 2003). 
I explicitly excluded self-poisoning, though some participants had experience of both 
types of self-harm. In contrast to much previous work on self-injury, this project was 
explicitly oriented towards the socio-cultural contexts in which self-injury took place, 
focusing on the life stories of twelve people who had self-injured. Sampling was 
purposive, and I aimed to recruit equal numbers of men and women who had a range 
of experiences with self-injury and with formal services. Participants were recruited 
from non-clinical community sites in a Scottish city, to increase the chances of 
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including people who had not engaged with formal support services. Adverts were 
placed in community centres and on an online community website. In addition, some 
participants were recruited via word of mouth and snowballing.  
 
Data Collection 
 
Each person was interviewed on two occasions between April 2007 and May 2008. 
The first interview explored the participant’s life story, guided in most cases by a life-
grid (Wilson et al., 2007). The life-grid is a research tool that allows participants to 
build up a ‘picture’ of their life story by filling in sections of a grid. The grid featured 
columns for each year of the participant’s life, and six rows covering the themes: 
education; employment; where and who I lived with; family and relationships; 
personal interests; health and ill-health. Participants used the grid in different ways, 
some sticking rigidly to the structure offered by the grid, while others used the topics 
as starting points for discussion. The second interview addressed self-injury more 
directly, with discussion exploring themes arising from the research more generally, 
along with issues identified during the participant’s first interview. The research was 
intended to be collaborative
3
, thus participants were encouraged to bring their own 
themes to the second interview.  
 
My original aims were broad and exploratory, however, throughout the course of the 
research my analytic focus was drawn towards talk about bodies, emotions and 
communication, and these became the three main themes in my analysis. Each of 
these is present in academic and lay accounts of self-injury, though they had been 
little discussed in existing sociological work. That I was not explicitly oriented 
towards studying emotional or embodied aspects of self-injury from the start of my 
research is potentially problematic. Indeed, because of my initially broad focus I did 
not routinely or systematically collect data on emotions, or on embodied, non-verbal 
aspects of the interviews. However, participants nevertheless included talk about both 
emotions and bodies in their accounts of their self-injury. Therefore, I was able to 
focus my later analysis on narratives of and about emotional and embodied 
understandings of self-injury. 
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Data analysis 
 
Analysis was a mixture of thematic and narrative techniques. Thematic content coding 
was conducted on the interview transcripts, while in my analytic writing I attempted 
to remain sensitive to the broader narrative contexts of the interviews. The transcribed 
interviews were coded using NVivo into the three broad themes of bodies, emotions 
and communication. This was followed by sub-coding, which was more inductive. 
Throughout analysis, I engaged with the context in which the accounts were given, 
acknowledging the place of each piece of coded text within participants’ broader 
narratives. Thus, although inevitably imperfect, I attempted to avoid ‘fracturing’ 
participants’ responses (Riessman, 1993). Participants’ interview talk was not viewed 
as a way of accessing their ‘inner thoughts’ or tapping into what they ‘really did’ 
when they self-injured (Atkinson, 1997). Rather, interviewees’ talk was examined as 
an account of their self-injury, specific to the context of their interviews with me. 
Thus, my own position and impact as collaborator and co-producer of knowledge was 
acknowledged throughout my analysis (Stanley & Wise, 1993).  
 
Findings: Self-injury and emotion work 
 
The final sample was relatively diverse, especially in contrast to the homogeneous 
nature of samples used in much of the existing literature
4
. Participants were aged 
between twenty-one and thirty-seven years old, five were male, seven female. 
Although the majority were studying for or had gained higher educational 
qualifications, the socio-economic backgrounds and current employment status of 
participants were more mixed. Importantly, participants reported a wide range of 
experiences with self-injury. Some had injured themselves regularly and extensively 
over many years, whilst others had injured themselves on only a few occasions. All 
participants said they had cut themselves, many also reported burning (using 
cigarettes, hot knives or metal) and hitting (using fists or hammers) themselves. 
Participants talked about similarly various experiences with psychiatric and medical 
services: three participants were heavily involved in psychiatric treatment, including 
inpatient hospital stays; two participants had never sought formal help for their self-
injury. Other participants reported varying involvement with services including: 
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receiving counselling; psychiatric medication and support from their General 
Practitioner; visits to Accident and Emergency (A&E) departments; and use of 
voluntary support agencies (e.g. The Samaritans).  
 
During the interviews participants frequently explored the reasons they had self-
injured, discussing the ways in which they felt self-injury had ‘worked’ for them and 
also describing self-injury as a form of ‘work’. Often, these accounts were explicitly 
embodied: referring both to feelings or emotions, as well as the practical, corporeal 
actions involved in self-injury. Participants’ descriptions of the ‘work’ that they did 
during self-injury, and their accounts of what was happening to their bodies when 
they self-injured parallel a number of theoretical approaches to embodiment: motifs of 
‘control’ and ‘release’; and neurochemical understandings of bodies. In most cases, 
participants’ accounts of the emotional aspects of their self-injury referred to some 
form of ‘working on’ their emotions through their body. In the following sections I 
introduce two particular ways in which participants described their self-injury as 
‘working on’ their emotions. Firstly, accounts which utilised the motif of control and 
release; secondly explanations that described self-injury as eliciting or creating 
emotions.  
 
Control and release 
 
Release, relief and control were used by many participants when describing their self-
injury. Release and relief were generally used interchangeably. For some participants 
the release that self-injury effected was said to allow them to regain ‘control’ over 
their emotions, selves and in some cases lives more generally. For other participants, 
self-injury was described as a way of controlling otherwise uncontrollable feelings. I 
will illustrate these issues through an examination of the narratives of two 
participants: Anna and Belinda
5
.  
 
Anna, aged 33, had first injured herself at the age of 14, when she broke her wrist 
with a hammer. She continued to hit herself and break bones until her early 20s, after 
a few years with no self-injury, she began to cut herself at the age of 27. Anna was 
engaged with psychiatric services; she had received several psychiatric diagnoses and 
had been prescribed psychotropic medicine. When I spoke with her, Anna reported 
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cutting herself regularly and increasingly extensively. She said she was worried that 
she might kill herself, as during her self-injury she sometimes felt suicidal (see 
Solomon & Farand, 1996 for similar findings on the potentially blurred line between 
self-injury and suicide).  
 
Anna’s discussions of her self-injury suggested that at times it might be experienced 
as ‘out of control’, however her descriptions more often indicated that self-injury 
allowed her to ‘release something’ and thus regain control: 
 
… when the situation seems to spiral and I’m whooo losing it. Em and it was like 
right, regain control, this is what I‘m gonna do, I’m gonna cut myself, well it wasnae 
as calculated as that… but cut myself… and I cut myself, my right arm I cut myself 
and it just wasnae,… it wasnae deep it was just ken what I mean it was just, crappy 
cuts... this is gonna sound so bad em, … and so I covered it up …and I was like ah,  
no... ken, its not happening, so I got my blade and I cut my other arm and … it… was, 
literally like I could feel it and hear it sortae like tearing open, but it was like it was 
happening to somebody else but: that was it, that was the one, it was like, it’s worked 
this time that, fine, d’you know what I mean? But it’s… it’s like, it’s like being there 
but not being there… and it’s, like, releasing something… and then when that 
whatever it is is released then your sortae regaining control… s’what it’s all about, 
it’s all about, control.6  
 
Anna’s narrative here is embodied, and demonstrates the ‘work’ that some 
participants said they had to put into self-injury for it to be experienced as effective. 
Anna suggests that she increasingly felt she had to inflict deeper wounds in order to 
effect this ‘release’. Anna is also clear here that her self-injury is a reaction to a 
‘situation’. She related a number of different episodes of self-injury, each of which 
was in response to situations or people that she found difficult to deal with. In 
particular, these appeared to be circumstances where she felt out of control: 
 
If I’m no in control of a situation, or if I’m no in control of what’s happenin’ … that’s 
when I self-harm, that’s when it’s like I have to, I have to regain this or I have to … 
like …take control or control something, […] sometimes I start to panic aboot things, 
and the only way I can stop panicking about it and think rationally about it is … cut 
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myself…it just like, I dunno it makes me just stop I suppose and then, it’s like right 
ok, deal wi it. So I think it’s like getting control or gaining control  
  
Here Anna’s narrative refers to explicitly emotional issues. She contrasts the ‘panic’ 
she sometimes feels with ‘thinking rationally’ which she said she was able to do 
following self-injury. This parallels theoretical work by Williams (1998a) on the late 
modern desire for control, and the tensions between rationality and emotions (see also 
Barbalet, 2001). Anna’s description of her self-injury draws on broader socio-cultural 
motifs which privilege rationality and calmness. Her self-injury is described as a way 
in which she achieves calmness and rationality, even in the face of situations in which 
she feels panicky and out of control. Thus, self-injury – more usually framed as 
irrational – becomes a rational, perhaps logical response to a difficult situation. This 
argument is similar to that made by Harris (2000) in her analysis of letters written by 
women who had cut themselves. Harris’s respondents associated the ‘relief’ afforded 
by self-injury with ‘relief’ at still being alive. In contrast, participants in my research 
described relief/release as being tied to control: over situations, emotions or selves.  
 
Belinda was aged 21, and had been injuring herself (mainly by cutting) since she was 
about 16. Belinda described her self-injury as changing in nature over time. Initially, 
she felt she had self-injured ‘impulsively’ at least in part to seek attention. Later, she 
said she self-injured in a more ‘controlled’ way, relating this directly to her attempts 
to manage her thoughts and feelings: 
 
… that’s just how I feel I guess, there’s so many thoughts and ideas and, and feelings, 
and everything just sort of, I don’t know it’s just everywhere (laughs) and it just has 
to come out – well, it doesn’t really have to come out. I just want it to sort of stop and 
slow so I can sort it, into something that I can, … understand and deal with, and em, 
yeah, and I guess sometimes when I can’t do that and I just, can’t do it and its just 
really frustrating, that’s when I, need to feel something, […] something that I know is 
real and it’s there and it’s concrete […] my arm hurts it’s bleeding, it’s a feeling, 
instead of just confusion and… not understanding things […] and trying to make 
something of, whatever’s in my head, to make it into something understandable and 
manageable… 
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Belinda associates the practical, corporeal results of self-injury – a bleeding, painful 
arm – with being better able to ‘manage’ the confusion in her head. Thus we have 
some elaboration here of the idea that self-injury might ‘transform’ emotional pain 
into physical pain. For Belinda, self-injury is described as a way of distracting, if not 
stopping, confusing thoughts and feelings by providing an alternative focus. 
Importantly for Belinda, the bleeding, painful arm is framed and perhaps experienced 
as something that is more ‘real’. This might offer some explanation as to why 
accounts which emphasise the transformative power of self-injury are so readily 
repeated and accepted. Such accounts may reflect broader socio-cultural privileging 
of physical over emotional suffering (Bendelow, 2009: 80). Belinda suggests it is the 
very disembodied, amorphous nature of emotions that makes them less preferable to 
‘physical’ pain which is described as more real, and, perhaps, more authentic. In 
addition, Belinda’s description of self-injury as ‘working’ to stop feelings of 
confusion could be seen to represent a non-pharmaceutical, non-clinical method of 
‘working on’ emotional problems through bodily means, lending support to Rose’s 
(2003) concept of somatic individuality. 
 
The narratives of Belinda and Anna demonstrate two ways in which motifs of control 
and release were utilised by participants in accounting for the ways in which self-
injury ‘worked’ to manage feelings or emotions: Anna gained control by ‘releasing’ 
something during self-injury; Belinda was able to manage her emotions in a 
controlled way, using the ‘concrete’ effects of self-injury to ‘distract’ herself. Simon 
Williams (1998b: 443) has claimed that late modernity is characterised by competing 
and contradictory ‘imperatives’ of control and release, rationality and desire. 
However, while Williams frames control as denial and release as pleasure, narratives 
about self-injury complicate this already difficult distinction. Anna’s account frames 
the ‘pleasure’ experienced through self-injury as being associated with the (bodily, 
self, social) control that the release was understood to effect. Both Belinda and Anna 
highlight control as a positive aspect of their practice of self-injury. I would suggest 
that Williams’ analysis is overly broad, failing to account for the different levels of 
control individuals experience in their day to day lives. For individuals experiencing 
little or no control over their self, body or life, any moment of snatched control might 
be experienced as pleasurable.   
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Eliciting emotions 
 
While the accounts discussed above refer to self-injury as releasing or controlling 
emotions, other participants described using self-injury to work upon their emotions 
by creating or eliciting feelings through self-injury. These narratives were strikingly 
similar to some of Hochschild’s (1979) earlier descriptions of emotion work. 
However, I will suggest that accounts of self-injury offer an explicit method of 
‘doing’ emotion work – more transparent than some of the descriptions of emotion 
work related by Hochschild.  Significantly, these accounts frequently drew upon 
biomedical or technical language to explain how self-injury was understood to 
function.  
 
Francis suggested that his self-injury had partly been oriented towards eliciting 
emotions where previously he felt ‘numb’. Francis was 25 and had injured himself on 
three or four occasions between the ages of 21 and 23. Francis’ ‘emotional problem’ 
was that he did not feel upset enough about events that had happened in his past, or 
did not feel able to express or display feelings he felt he ‘should’ be feeling: 
 
I wasn’t pretending that I wasn’t upset but I would just, I wasn’t letting people know I 
was upset, if you see what I mean. I think that em, that got to me, after a while, that I 
felt I was incapable of feeling anything, you know incapable of emotion and…. 
Em…. I didn’t like that, I wanted to be able to feel I wanted to, you know, live or 
experience stuff or… and so, self-harming was, you know a way of, feeling, pain, you 
know feeling pain ‘cos it was something.  
 
Francis’ discussion here reflects some of the difficulty faced when attempting to 
articulate emotions or feelings. There is a blurring between what is ‘really’ felt, what 
is displayed, and what is communicated. Francis’ account indicates that he felt he 
‘should’ be feeling upset, but he struggled to identify whether he was ‘really’ upset, or 
whether he was having difficulty expressing his upset. Self-injury is framed as 
offering a way of feeling something less elusive, less opaque and – as Belinda 
mentioned above – more concrete: the pain, blood, and visible nature of self-injury 
are described as being more tangible than emotions. As with Belinda’s description of 
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self-injury as transformative, Francis’ account privileges physical suffering over 
emotional suffering. In both cases physical pain is framed as more visible, and 
therefore, more ‘real’, or authentic. Francis and Belinda provide these accounts by 
drawing on ‘acceptable’ understandings about the relative desirability and importance 
of ‘emotional’ versus ‘physical’ pain.  
 
Justin was 29 and had self-injured between the ages of around 16 and 24. Justin had a 
relatively positive narrative about his early self-injury, between the ages of 16 and 18. 
He described his early self-injury as working upon feelings of social anxiety; a 
situational response to events where he was struggling to feel ‘appropriately’: 
 
I definitely remember kind of, you know, getting sort of [a] rush, from it, you know if 
you were feeling a bit down and you kind of just, you know, saw the blood and then 
you’d be like, you know that would kind of, you know, give you a kind of rush, em, 
and then you could kind of, you know, … I mean I was always quite shy as a child 
and stuff, em, … and, I guess like if it was in sort of social situations where there was 
a whole bunch of people downstairs, you could, you know, cut yourself, get a rush, 
and then, you could kind of, you know it was like sort of, you know almost like a sort 
of, almost like drinking […] basically, like it would give you a kind of you know, 
Dutch courage or something.  
 
This account parallels Hochschild’s (1979: 561) example of someone at a party 
reflecting: “I made myself have a good time”. In contrast to the account presented by 
Hochschild, Justin is more explicit about the method he used to improve his mood and 
his ability to subsequently deal with social situations. Further, Justin suggested that 
self-injury ‘worked’ because self-cutting caused an ‘adrenaline rush’: 
 
I think the first time it was associated with kind of a rush and, and a buzz […] it was 
more of a, sort of the, … the blood and the, … sort of you know adrenaline […] rush, 
em, … so, … yeah, with, I wouldn’t really say that it was, you know done for the, the 
pain 
 
Such accounts of self-injury could be seen to lend support to Rose’s (2003) concept of 
somatic individuality. Justin, and other participants in my research, accounted for the 
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success of their self-injury in terms of its neurochemical effects. Both Rease and Mark 
said that self-injury caused endorphins to be ‘released’ or to ‘flow’, which created a 
feeling of well-being. This latter explanation reflects an oft repeated biomedical 
understanding of how self-injury functions, though not one borne out by clinical 
research as yet (Chandler et al., 2011).  
 
Justin emphasised the difference in sensation between the ‘buzz’ and any suggestion 
that he cut himself to feel ‘pain’. In his description of this, Justin tied the ‘work’ he 
did on his emotions explicitly to his body: both in terms of the practical, corporeal 
actions involved (self-cutting), and in the way in which he accounted for the effects of 
these actions (neurochemical). Mark made a similar distinction, also using 
neurochemical terminology to explain physical sensations: 
 
I mean both of them you’ve got endorphins flowing if you’ve, if you’ve got up the 
nerve to pick up a knife and cut yourself or you’re being thrown out of a club by a 
bouncer you’re, the adrenaline is flowing and all the rest of it […] so the physical 
sensation I think is probably pretty much the same 
 
In this discussion Mark attempted to account for the lack of pain he felt during self-
cutting, comparing it to an incident where a friend had been injured but had not 
noticed. Like Justin, his account draws on technical, biomedical terms to explain and 
describe physical sensations. Other participants suggested that self-injury did not hurt 
because the brain ‘released’ pain-relieving ‘chemicals’. These accounts drew on 
neurochemical understandings of the body, but also on metaphors of releases or flows, 
similar to those identified by Lupton (1998b) in her work on lay understandings of the 
emotional body. 
 
These narratives highlight the difficulty participants had in accounting for their self-
injury as both emotional and physical, whilst also treating emotions and physicality as 
separate. In particular, this issue was expressed when participants discussed the role 
of pain in their self-injury. These difficulties both reflect and challenge the enduring 
power of dualist understandings of bodies and emotions, lending support to Williams 
and Bendelow’s work on pain and the limitations of dualism (1998).  
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The practice of self-injury itself, and indeed embodied emotion work in general, also 
support Rose’s concept of somatic individuality. Both refer to explicit attempts to 
improve the (emotional) self by acting on the body. If emotional problems are 
increasingly understood to originate in the body, whose hormones or chemicals are 
somehow malfunctioning (and often treated physically with drugs), then acting 
towards that body through self-injury, or other methods of embodied emotion work, 
might be a more understandable course of action. Thus, accounts of self-injury might 
be more likely to draw on narratives which implicate the (neurochemical) body in 
attempts to improve emotional well-being. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The ideas presented here are based on in-depth, qualitative research with a small 
number of people who have self-injured. In this paper I have explored in detail one 
particular way of accounting for self-injury – that it is an embodied method of 
managing emotions. There are, however, many different interpretations and 
understandings of self-injury that would benefit from sociological attention, some of 
which I explore elsewhere (Chandler, 2010). Further sociological work is needed to 
more fully examine the suggestions and conclusions I have made here. In particular, 
future work should attend to potential contrasts between accounts of self-injury 
among different social groups (e.g. men and women, younger and older people).  
 
The analysis of self-injury offered here demonstrates the usefulness of explicitly 
engaging with embodied methods of doing emotion work. The accounts I have 
discussed highlight the importance of examining the corporeal ‘work’ that can be 
involved in embodied methods of doing emotion work, such as self-injury. This 
‘work’ was central to participants’ accounts of their self-injury, demonstrating that 
even when not directly attached to economic activity, emotion work can involve 
(physical) labour. My analysis of self-injury also serves to emphasise the relative lack 
of attention given to other embodied methods of doing emotion work, despite 
Hochschild’s early (and in some ways pioneering) emphasis on the embodied nature 
of both emotions and emotion work. Even where emotion work is considered solely as 
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an analytic category (Frith & Kitzinger 1998), attending to embodied aspects of this 
‘work’ allows a more explicit examination of the different methods individuals might 
use to manage their emotions. Future research should address embodied methods, 
rather than taking for granted that people simply ‘do’ emotion work. Doing so would 
allow a more practical, corporeal orientation of our understanding of social life 
(Crossley, 2007). 
 
Examining the ways in which embodied emotion work is used as a participant 
resource (Frith & Kitzinger 1998) by people who have self-injured affords an 
important, further layer of analysis; offering further affirmation of the importance of 
embodiment in emotional accounts, as well as adding a more nuanced analysis of 
emotion work itself. Participants drew upon narratives incorporating embodied 
emotion work to justify and account for their use of self-injury to manage their 
emotions. They did this in two inter-related ways: framing self-injury as rational; and 
drawing on biomedical language to lend authority to their accounts.  
 
Emotion work was used as a way of presenting self-injury as a rational – if not always 
successful – response to problematic emotions and situations. Participants frequently 
set up self-injury as a method of gaining control over otherwise uncontrollable or 
intangible feelings. In this way, their accounts reflected dominant, dualist 
understandings regarding the irrational nature of emotions (Jackson & Scott, 1997; 
Williams, 1998a). These accounts challenge psychiatric interpretations of self-harm, 
which more usually frame the practice as irrational and impulsive (Redley 2010). 
Thus, participants portrayed themselves as ultimately rational, capable actors who 
were addressing – albeit in an unconventional manner – unwanted, undesirable 
emotions.  
 
In many accounts, the embodied nature of self-injury was framed as central to 
explaining the efficacy of the practice in improving emotional states. In these cases, 
participants often drew upon technical, biomedical language. Using such language 
could be seen as an attempt to lend weight to accounts of self-injury which, as noted 
above, is more usually framed as irrational and impulsive. By framing self-injury as a 
practice which acts upon the body in ‘concrete’ ways – affecting endorphins or 
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adrenaline flows – such accounts appropriate the power of dominant biomedical 
narratives about bodies. These narratives reflect the increasing encroachment of 
biomedical explanations into accounts of emotions and emotional life (Rose, 2003; 
Stepnisky, 2007).  
 
Biomedical accounts of self-injury, and those which emphasise rationality over 
emotions, each incorporate enduring and powerful dualist modes of thought 
(Crossley, 2001; Williams & Bendelow, 1998). Explanations of self-injury that 
privilege rationality over excess emotionality suggest that these states are opposed 
and mutually exclusive. Similarly, where narratives about self-injury are embodied 
through the use of biomedical language, biomedicine and physicality are also 
privileged over emotions. Thus, although self-injury is increasingly associated with 
‘emotional problems’ in clinical literature, individual accounts of the practice 
complicate this understanding. These accounts do implicate ‘emotional problems’, but 
self-injury is offered as a rational, biomedically justified response, grounded in 
practical actions (cutting, burning or hitting). Perhaps significantly, self-injury is 
framed as generally more successful, or preferable, to other potential responses: 
talking, or ‘cognitive’ emotional work. In this way, self-injury might be seen to 
broadly mirror biological approaches to understanding ‘mental’ illness, approaches 
which some have warned might lead to the ‘silencing’ of “entire realms of life” 
(Stepnisky, 2007: 203). Simultaneously, focusing on self-injury in terms of individual 
‘emotional problems’ could well ‘silence’ attempts to examine wider social processes 
that might contribute towards, or shape potential responses to, such problems.  
 
It is possible however, that each of these findings at least partly resulted from the 
nature and contexts of the research interviews. As noted above, many of my 
participants were university educated, and this coupled with my position as an 
educated person, researching self-injury academically, may have encouraged certain 
types of accounts. Emphasising rationality, and drawing on technical, biomedical 
language to lend authority to accounts of self-injury may have been specific to the 
context of this research and the individuals involved with it. Again, this highlights the 
need for further research on self-harm which examines more diverse groups of people, 
especially those living in different socio-economic contexts.   
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Accounts of self-injury as embodied emotion work further demonstrates both the 
problematic nature and enduring power of dualist approaches to mind/body, 
rationality/ emotions (Crossley 2001; Williams & Bendelow 1998). Although 
narratives about the practice of self-injury do endeavour to split off mind and body, 
emotions and rationality, the very embodied nature of self-injury complicates and 
frustrates these attempts. In particular, accounts that indicate ‘work’ being done on the 
emotions, via the body, force an acknowledgement of the interconnected nature of 
mind and body. Thus, sociological analyses of self-injury as embodied emotion work 
offer a more nuanced, practical and potentially more useful perspective than clinical 
accounts which instead tend to reproduce dualist interpretations of emotions, bodies, 
rationality and mind.  
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1
 Self-injury and self-harm are contested definitions in social scientific research also. See Scourfield 
2011 and Inckle 2007 for alternative perspectives. 
2
 It is very difficult to know whether rates of self-harm actually are increasing, or whether they are 
being more readily identified and recorded. 
3
 In practice, most participants were uninterested in becoming overly involved in the project outside of 
being interviewed. I discuss this in more detail elsewhere (Chandler 2010).  
4
 As noted above, previous studies have focused on specific groups: women, young people, clinical 
patients.  
5
 All names are pseudonyms.  
6
 In quotations “…” refers to a pause in participants’ talk; “[…]” indicates that some of the transcript 
has been removed by me. 
 
